Tidal Station

BC Ferry Commissioner Regulatory Review and a single burning hole

2012-01-27T17:17:00.000-08:00

I've flipped through the BC Ferry Commissioner's Regulatory Review with some interest. I'll withhold comment for now on a majority of it, although I will suggest that many of the recommendations are a long time coming.

What grabbed me instantly, however, was the graph on page 18 of the report. From 2004 to 2011 the cost of maintenance has been virtually unchanged. That, in an environment where inflation has been driving costs up at a little over 2.3 percent per year.

If BC Ferries was carrying out the same level of fleet and terminal maintenance today that they were before they were flipped over to a profit model the cost of maintenance should have increased. Even if there were efficiencies, it would have been impossible to maintain ships to a high standard of reliability and safety without a scaled increase in maintenance costs.

The first thing to go when a shipping company cheaps out on maintenance is quality control. Inspection falls by the wayside. Small things go unnoticed. Pins are left out and nuts are not torqued down.

Costa Concordia Final Track (Updated 22 Jan)

2012-01-21T09:29:00.000-08:00

The Netherlands company QPS, a software development company specializing in navigation and vessel traffic service has generated and refined the track using all the AIS data available. Additionally, there is a PDF available to take you through page views.

There are several other simulated tracks floating around which suggest the ship took a course through the rocks. That is unlikely since the ECDIS, ARPAs and echo sounders would have been issuing a series of alarms which, even if silenced by the officer of the watch, would have alerted the bridge to the requirement for an immediate course alteration.

There are a couple of other simulations which have been posted publicly suggesting that there are a pair of East Cardinal Marks on a line of about 315 degrees just to the south of the rocks known as Le Scole which is the suspected point of Costa Concordia touching bottom. A thorough sifting of various lists of lights and buoys and a look though data-bases and S57 charts produces no such aids to navigation in that area.

At the risk of speculating too early, it appears there was an attempt to alter away from Le Scole but that it came too late and the stern was turned into bottom.

Finally, until there is a report from an initial investigation the media feeding frenzy will continue. If any of this is true however, it should serve as a lesson for those few who presume to adopt the characterization of a "rock-star" master. Yes, we all appear on the stage from time to time and introduce the crew. Yes, we have brief interactions with passengers - a quick meet & greet is sufficient. The overwhelming majority of the time, however, is spent ensuring the ship is safe, running smoothly and crew proficiency is on an upward curve.

UPDATE 22/1945 UTC: QPS has updated the Costa Concordia final track. You can watch it here.

Just so you know, this is not the first time Costa Concordia deviated from it passage plan and approved route. Lloyd's List Intelligence tracking shows that the ship made a very similar pass on Islio Giglio on 14 August 2011.

EXCLUSIVE analysis of Lloyd’s List Intelligence tracking data shows that Costa Concordia sailed within 230 m of the coast of Giglio Island on a previous voyage, slightly closer to the shore than where it subsequently hit rocks on Friday.

The cruiseship, which capsized off the Italian coast, had previously changed course to get closer to Giglio on the night of August 14 last year — for La Notte di San Lorenzo, the night of the shooting stars, owners Costa Cruises have said

Speaking at a news conference on Monday, the company’s chief executive officer, Pier Luigi Foschi, stressed that the decision was taken under the authorisation of the local martime authority and the permission of Costa, after the route was reviewed. He also claimed that the vessel was never closer than 500 metres from the coast at any pont in the voyage.

The route taken on January 13, however, was described by Costa Cruises as a deviation from the pre-planned route to make a manoeuvre that was “unauthorised, unapproved and unknown to Costa”.

Both routes passed within a few hundred metres of each other and the tracking data, obtained through Lloyd’s List Intelligence proprietary land based AIS receivers, proves that the vessel would have been less than 200 m away from the point of collision when it took the previously authorised route. The route also took the vessel far closer than the 500 metres claimed by Costa Crociere.

Let the speculation begin (Passenger Control edition)

2012-01-15T00:29:00.000-08:00

The Costa Concordia disaster will be the subject of massive amounts of speculation.

And so it should be.

Given the modern era and the regulations under which ships sail, it takes an extraordinary circumstance and extraordinary conditions to put a ship, in transit, into the peril which befell the Costa Concordia.

One of the first issues which arises is the ship's attention to passenger safety management. All passenger conveying companies are required to train their crews in passenger control during an emergency; too many treat it as a mere annoyance. A cost of training which they would otherwise not engage unless forced to do so.

Costa Concordia was meeting the minimum requirement. Her passengers were berthed, settled and at dinner, (in all their dining finery), before they had ever been involved in a passenger muster and boat drill. Their first drill was scheduled for 1700 on the day after they had departed.

That's simply the worst way to present passengers with the method for evacuation and the least likely way to invest the crew in passenger control. The passengers had no idea how to muster and the crew had not gathered in the passenger complement.

Swept up ships never leave that kind of thing to chance. The best way to ensure passengers get a feel for how to participate in their own survival is to conduct a passenger muster and boat drill before the ship departs. That includes lowering boats to the embarkation level so they can see what will happen. If passengers are sitting at dinner joking about the next day's drill and wondering about their fate if something should happen before then, the ship simply hasn't done it properly. Costa Concordia ran square into Murphy's Law.

A good master never stops thinking about Murphy's Law.

When you hit a rock the cruise is over. So is your career, so quit worrying about it.

Under IMO guidance the best life boat is your ship. From all appearances the master of Costa Concordia made every effort to get the ship to a safe port. No fault there. He almost made it. I do question, however, the sense of urgency imparted to the passengers.

Notwithstanding the clear lack of a passenger drill prior to departure, the passengers which have spoken out state that there was confusion. No doubt. There always will be. Some made reference to the Titanic. They always do. So, it makes a great deal of sense to eliminate the fear that thought brings. Complete honesty and a realistic assessment of the situation is imperative. These are not company customers; they are the ship's passengers. They are in the same situation as the crew - except that they have no training. Everyone fears that they will panic. They won't if they have confidence in the people who will ensure their survival. They can't do that unless they know who those people are.

No boat drill. No confidence. Immediate thought? Titanic. I'm going to die. No alarm at the outset of an emergency and a full public announcement of what is known? Panic.

Passenger control? Difficult to achieve. Some will jump in the water. Proof? Costa Concordia.

Yes, I know. They're getting settled and unpacking their belongings and reading the menu and having their first romantic boff. A drill so interferes with their "experience" so early into the voyage.

And in this case, that's exactly what did not happen.

Distress from Costa Concordia (Updated x 3)

2012-01-13T21:48:00.000-08:00

Reports are that the 290 meter 114,500 ton cruise ship Costa Concordia has run aground 42 50N 12 50E, on Isola Del Giglio, Italy

More later.

Update 14/0730 UTC: First pictures are coming in. This was sent from Giglio just a few minutes ago.

As you can see, Costa Concordia has rolled over on her side and sunk against the rocks just outside the breakwater at Isola del Giglio. There are various reports that anywhere from 6 to 8 people have perished after the ship struck bottom and ripped a 50 meter gash below the waterline on her port side. Estimates are that 35 people suffered injuries, some of them serious.

First reports are suggesting the ship developed a major electrical fault and may have drifted into reefs outside Porto Giglio. Apparently everyone is now off the vessel.

Giglio news has a webcam here which gives you a view of the harbour and the Concordia wreck. You might have some trouble getting on. It's busy.

Update 14/1725 UTC: The BBC has several video shots of the ship. This first one shows her laying against the rocks. This second set gives you a better picture of the damage. (Scroll down to the 2nd video on that page).

The damage is massive which would indicate this vessel hit bottom with a considerable amount of force. I'm questioning the "electrical fault" which was first announced. From the damage sustained and the location it looks more like the any electrical failure likely occurred post-grounding.

Also, note that the damage is on the port side. The ship rolled over to starboard. That tells a story in itself. More on that later.

Update 14/2045 UTC: Last update before a whole new post on the subject. Take a real hard look at this picture.

Inside that massive tear in the hull is a ROCK. That rock is approximately the same size as the 25 person liferaft hanging in the upper right of the photo. This ship did not drift onto the rocks; it hammered them with enough forward momentum to rip away and embed something a bulldozer would have a tough time moving.

Spinning more than the propellers

2012-01-13T15:21:00.000-08:00

[I was actually working on something new and "tankerish" since it has been my good fortune to have made several trips up Douglas Channel as Chief Mate in nothing less than a chemical tanker carrying condensate. That, however, will have to wait, so check back in the next few days for it. This latest little bit of incident involving a BC Ferry is more immediate.]

Right now BC Ferries must be feeling a bit beleaguered, not unlike Al Capp's, Joe Btfsplk.

The latest mishap to befall the company is an engineering casualty in MV Queen of Oak Bay. Apparently there was smoke in the engine room and the master quite rightly issued a call for assistance after going to fire stations.

What isn't clear, (and it won't be until an initial investigation is completed), is what actually happened. There are initial reports that the QoOB suffered a crankcase explosion. Subsequently Deborah Marshall, BC Ferries public information person, stated that it was a smoking clutch.

There would be no reason to disbelieve Ms. Marshall's statement if it weren't for one major issue: BC Ferries has been less than sincerely honest when answering public questions. Understandably, BC Ferries would like to mitigate the effect of such mishaps by, perhaps, minimizing them to the point of insignificance. A loss of public confidence in British Columbia's Crown-owned ferry system could create a debilitating effect on ridership especially during the high tourist season.

Now we get further questions because the past obfuscations leave everyone in doubt. Was it a smoking clutch, or was it a crankcase problem? Or would it have been best to simply say, we have not yet isolated the source of the smoke.

And then there's the smoke issue. According to Ms. Marshall:

It's my understanding the smoke was contained to below the car deck

Yet according to a passenger:

We could see smoke and some of the employees began getting into firefighting outfits. They started pushing us all to the front of the boat and closed the fire doors to the rest of the boat.

Somebody has it wrong. The passenger description suggests that he was in the passenger area, (the presence of fire doors), and that smoke did infiltrate above the car decks.

Ms. Marshall is but the voice of a larger body. That body, however, has been consistent in masking the events surrounding incidents of this nature and the past behaviour of hiding information until they were ordered to submit to FOI requests does nothing to garner public confidence - in either the information nor the system itself.

By way of example, when the Queen of Nanaimo failed to slow on 3 August and hit the berth at Mayne Island it was blamed on the ship picking up a crab trap line and shaking loose a pair of dowels on the port hydraulic distribution box. My chief engineer at the time read the report and said, "Not bloody likely."

Subsequently an internal BC Ferries investigation turned up that the dowels in the port hydraulic distribution box were not properly secured. Vibration, the report concluded, would not have been enough to shake loose the dowels. Crab trap line or not, those dowels were going to work their way loose.

The fact is a more honest approach would be to simply admit to not having enough information to answer immediate questions. And for those questions to which there are clear answers, just answer truthfully. As can be seen from past incidents, when the initial minimizing turns out to be completely false the loss of confidence is immediate and lasting.

I might add that the redactions on page 15 and Appendix B-SOR14 of this report simply generates suspicion when not properly explained.

The future of BC Ferries: The editorial

2012-01-07T09:58:00.000-08:00

This one comes from Craig McInnes at the Vancouver Sun. It is certainly worth reading. There is a bit of historical inaccuracy, although that should not deter you from absorbing the basic premise of McInnes' opinion: that any ferry system in BC is ultimately subject to the swirl of provincial politics.

McInnes suggests that Hahn's compensation issue was a sideshow. On the surface that may well be true, however, Mr. Hahn often appeared to lack a complete understanding of his position. He should have been aware from the start that his position was not that of a private sector CEO, no more than BC Ferries in the Gordon Campbell restructuring was not a private company.

At one point Hahn responded in an interview that, aside from having to keep travelers appeased, his biggest single customer was the government of British Columbia. True as that statement might be, it demonstrated a failure to acknowledge that his "biggest single customer" got every penny of its money from BC taxpayers and therefore voters.

Got doors?

2011-12-31T14:42:00.000-08:00

Got a roll on - roll off in class? You've got a new rule.

Not all rules come out of the International Maritime Organization nor federally regulated maritime administrations. In this case there is a new survey requirement for shell and/or inner doors of both passenger and cargo roll on - roll off ships which comes from the International Association of Classification Societies in the form of a Unified Requirement.

IACS UR Z24 is the new survey requirement for Shell and Inner doors of roll on - roll off ships, both cargo and passenger. (You'll have to scroll down to page 711 of a rather large PDF to get to the details). When this UR first hit table in November 2010 it seemed to refer only to ships fitted with a self-stowed loading ramp. Then a member of the IACS pointed out that "some ro-ro ships are not fitted with a loading ramp, but rather utilize a shore-based ramp since these vessels are on a common trade route." In July 2011, the IACS amended UR Z24 to include all ro-ro and ropax ships with shell doors, (bow, side and stern), leading to a ro-ro deck or special category space.

Generally, this survey requirement is pretty typical although there are some points which might give some operators a few moments of pause:

Door structures, securing, supporting, locking device, welds and sockets are subject to non-destructive testing. The maximum wear allowed beyond as-built thickness is 15 percent.

Door seals will be inspected and water tested. (More on this below).

Hinges, bearings and thrust bearings will be measured and, if not accessible to a surveyor, dismantled to gain access.

Vehicle deck drainage systems with storm valves or non-return valves will have to be dismantled.

The other usual things will also be carried out:

Correct panel lights, including a panel lamp test on all door operating and indicator panels; closed-circuit TV cameras; water leak detection system (if fitted); and, system isolation when not in use.

The following couple of items are going to give a couple of different companies a few moments of grief:

Confirmation that the operating panels are inaccessible to unauthorized persons. (That means denying possible access to all operating panels by people who should not be anywhere near them, such as passengers and uninvolved crew).

Verification that a notice plate giving instructions to the effect that all securing devices are to be closed and locked before leaving harbour is placed at each operating panel and supplemented by warning indicator lights. (That should be self-explanatory but you'd be surprised at how many ropax ships have no such instructions posted).

Weathertight doors
This may be one of the most misunderstood definitions in the ro-ro community. Too often seafarers interpret weathertight to mean "rainproof", and that is simply not the case.

Weathertight doors are required to be able to withstand the most severe maritime conditions when the ship is at sea including pressure from wave action and prevent the ingress of water onto the cargo/vehicle deck. Even in a damaged state, if the door is partially submerged, it is expected to withstand water to a pressure of 0.35 bar (5 lbs per square inch) to a height of 3.5 meters measured from the bottom of the door.

This is where the door seals come into play and the water testing of doors may create some issues. Weathertight doors are expected to keep water off the ro-ro deck under even the most extreme conditions. If any water finds its way through the seals during a hose test there is a very good chance the door does not meet the standard.

Door movement
How many ways can inward opening ro-ro deck doors be described as dangerous?

Of course, you could be like Washington State Ferries and simply not bother with doors at all.

More than scrap value

2011-12-31T08:44:00.000-08:00

And only 40 percent of the asking price.

The two former Albion ferries have been sold to Tidal Towing of Port Coquitlam.

TransLink spokesman Drew Snider confirmed in a news release that Tidal Towing purchased the MV Kulleet and MV Klatawa.

Price for both: $400,000

Kulleet and Klatawa are class sisterships of BC Ferries Klitsa (formerly Denman Queen).

Too much spin. Not enough fact.

2011-12-29T17:39:00.000-08:00

Thanks to On The Waterfront and The Gazeteer we get the semi-informed opinion of British Columbia's GlobalBC (television) chief political reporter. (You might want to read those two blogs first and then come back to what I have to say. Both take the position that the attempt to diminish an uncontrolled crash into the berth is spouting the BC Ferries party line).

I agree, because Mr. Baldry's lack of attention to facts impeaches any other point he might have been trying to make.

Of course, four "hard" landings so far this year seems excessive. But BC Ferries responds that its fleet sails more than 187,000 times a year and averages about a dozen hard landings (of various degrees) a year, which seems to put things in perspective.

And what perspective would that be? As OTW pointed out early, this isn't about odds. It's about making sure your passengers are delivered safely to their destination every single time. And, as you can see from her post I linked to at the top, Washington State Ferries, the other large North American ferry operator, is claiming two "hard landings" in two years.

As for odds, they aren't a part of the picture in this industry. I am required to navigate something considerably larger than a BC Ferry over or around thousands of rocks safely. If I wish to retain any semblance of my position on the bridge of a ship, I am absolutely required to miss every single one. I do not have, (and no professional mariner has), the luxury of using a ratio of rocks hit to rocks missed to justify a single event of running aground.

Mr. Baldry goes on to lay out costs and tosses this in:

An extra $1 million a year in additional operating costs is courtesy of Transport Canada's staffing rules on vessels.

That's what is called a "drive-by statement". Because it reads as some punitive measure imposed on BC Ferries by the nasty federal regulator it throws a haze on the truth, either intentionally on Mr. Baldry's part or because he just isn't in possession of the facts. He is clearly talking about the requirement for Minimum Safe Manning Documents, an international requirement to which Canada must subscribe to keep its merchant marine, even its domestic fleets, within the treaty framework of the International Maritime Organization. In short, a MSM Document lists the minimum number and least allowable qualification of members of a ship's crew required to safely operate the vessel while responding to an emergency.

Further, Mr. Baldry seems to have swallowed somebody's propaganda. BC Ferries worked with Transport Canada and chose to reduce passenger capacity instead of increase crew complement to meet the requirements of minimum safe manning. The impact of the regulation requiring minimum safe manning was minimal on BC Ferries in terms of crew size. Additionally, in order to keep crew complement at the pre-MSM levels BC Ferries upgraded the lifesaving, evacuation and fire-fighting systems on only two minor vessels.

The federal agency's new sewage treatment rules come into effect next summer, and BC Ferries has been required to spend more than $60 million to comply with them.

Once again, he carries out a "drive-by". BC Ferries, and all other ship/boat operators in Canada have had 8 years to bring themselves up to compliance with this international requirement. Up to now Canada has not been in compliance with the IMO Pollution Convention even though we had ratified the treaty.

Mr. Baldry then goes on to say this:

For example, does there really need to be 16 trips a day between Nanaimo and Gabriola Island? Does there need to be almost 30 trips a day from Salt Spring Island to various locations? For that matter, does Salt Spring Island really need three ferry terminals?
Now, the very idea of chopping even one money losing sailing on these routes does, of course, elicit howls of rage from those who live on those islands.

I suppose if you live in Vancouver or Victoria or Nanaimo, those routes probably don't matter all that much. And, it has been very much a BC Ferries party line, ever since they were severed from the ministry. The fact, however, is that the routes Baldry suggests might be able to be eliminated or reduced are former Ministry of Transport and Highways routes. BC Ferries acquired them in 1985 when they took over the MOTH fleet, its routes and its personnel. The truth is, those islands are a part of British Columbia and the residents are citizens. To increase their isolation, (let the "if you choose to live on an island" howls begin), is to violate the compact that was established when BC Ferries acquired the MOTH ferry operations.

Perhaps the most egregious line in Mr. Baldry's piece is this:

The most recent crash will be investigated and perhaps lessons will be learned from it and that will be that (until the next serious hard landing or accident).

Cavalier and dismissive. 14 people killed on or by BC Ferries? Corollary damage. They'll never be any better than what they are. You could be next.

I don't see Keith Baldry being consulted on maritime safety anytime soon.

About that Assumed Average Weight Per Person thing

2011-12-28T00:08:00.000-08:00

Updated below ...

There has been a lot of mirth about the US Coast Guard regulation requiring passenger vessels to alter stability calculations in relation to the "Assumed Average Weight Per Person".

Effective 1 December 2011, the Assumed Average Weight Per Person was increased from 160 lbs. to 185 lbs. The impact on US flagged passenger vessels is significant, particularly smaller types. In Washington State the ferry system declared that (rather than weigh every passenger) they would be reducing their passenger capacity to stay within the stability criteria established for each ship. (I'm not sure about the heeling moment that would occur in a ship like the Puyallup if everyone ran to one side).

It's not just Americans

In fact, during the notification phase the USCG received several submissions. At least two recommended that the AAWPP be increased to 187 lbs., the actual average weight of American adults.

Before anyone starts pointing too quickly at the population of the US there should be some heed paid to decisions by the International Maritime Organization's Maritime Safety Committee. The MSC made amendments to the International Life Saving Appliances code taking effect in October 2010 and then again to take effect 1 January 2012.

Under international rules the former average assumed weight of occupants of lifeboats, liferafts and rescue boats was 75 kg (165 lbs). Effective Oct 2010 the new assumed average weight of all persons, worldwide, getting into a lifeboat became 82.5 kg (182 lbs). As of 1 January 2012 the new mass of 82.5 kg per person applies to all survival craft, worldwide.

Looks like we're all getting fatter.

Good question: From Christina, in comments, about life jackets and whether there have been any changes to match the changes in survival craft. The answer is, YES. Go here for details.

New requirements for the carriage of additional equipment, also effective July 1, 2010,
have been introduced under the SOLAS Convention, as follows:

• On all ships where adult lifejackets are not designed to fit persons weighing up to 140 kg with a chest girth of up to 1,750 mm, suitable accessories are to be provided that allow the lifejacket to be secured to such persons.
• All passenger ships are to be provided with lifejackets for “infants”.

Update 30/12: The infant lifejacket requirement noted above prompted an offline question: How many?
The answer is as follows:
1. For vessels on voyages under 24 hours: 2.5 percent of the total passengers.
2. For vessels on voyages of 24 hours or greater: An approved "infant" lifejacket for every infant onboard.
Infant lifejackets should be marked INFANT.

High drama off the Antarctic ice shelf

2011-12-27T08:25:00.000-08:00

The crew of the 48 meter Russian fishing vessel Sparta have spent the last week struggling to keep their ship upright and afloat.

Luckily, or perhaps just thankfully, there was help nearby and they're no longer on their own. The South Korean ice-breaker Araon has arrived to assist in making repairs and, temporarily at least, bring the fishing vessel's stability condition back to a point where they can make their way to safety.

The question, once the Sparta is safe, is what she was doing there in the first place?

The Sparta was in the Ross Sea off the Antarctic ice shelf fishing for Patagonian Toothfish, a species of sea bass which brings anywhere from US$50 - 60 per kg. In the process of her expedition she struck Antarctic ice and punched a significant hole in her hull well below the waterline. She has a second hole in her bulbous bow which is not expected to prevent her progress to a safe port.

This is "Gold Rush" fishing.

The Sparta is a 24-year old, single-skinned trawler/long-liner. Hardly the class of vessel that should be inhabiting the ice infested waters of the Antarctic. She has liferafts but no lifeboats. In waters that cold liferafts would be near useless. She is a typically underpowered fishing vessel designed for a completely different kind of service. Had the Royal New Zealand Air Force not dropped pumps to her she would likely have sunk and, despite only having a portion of her 180 tonnes of fuel onboard, would have created an unprecedented environmental mess in an area where clean-up would have been near impossible.

She was licensed to fish in the Antarctic closed ecosystem by the Commission on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.

About that awesome ferry crash

2011-12-23T22:27:00.001-08:00

Yes, well. The BC Ferries Super C class ships were described by the corporation itself as being awesome. I'm reckoning you know that's not what I mean.

The 21 December crash into Berth 1 at Duke Point was awesome. And before anybody tries to correct me, 5 knots headlong into the ramp is not a "hard landing"; it's a crash.

Some initial reading
There has been a fairly busy exchange of information going on at On The Waterfront by Vancouver journalist Christina Montgomery. This initial post is merely an expansion of some of the information there and I would recommend reading through the posts and the comments related to the crash of Coastal Inspiration.

Different ship - same gremlin
BC Ferries reports that an electronic failure occurred preventing the pitch control on the drive propeller to respond to bridge controls. That means that this is the second time a Super C has lost pitch control when approaching a berth. Coastal Renaissance experienced something similar two years ago. The difference there was that the ship was well back from the berth and the problem occurred as the ship was supposed to be slowing to make its approach. When the ship failed to slow in response to bridge command it sent senior engineers scrambling and the problem was rectified before the landing was affected.

The decision that saved a few million bucks
The Super Cs are propelled by a diesel-electric machinery system. In simple terms "prime movers" generate electrical propulsion power which is transferred to electric drive motors. In a decision which caused Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, (the builder), some concern, the drive motors run at a constant speed turning shafts at either end which mount variable pitch propellers. Speed is controlled by changing the pitch angle of the propeller blades. In transit mode the "forward" propeller is feathered to reduce drag and the ship is driven by the "aft" motor, shaft and propeller. To reduce speed in transit mode the pitch angle on the drive propeller blades is reduced to give it less bite. While this is effective and efficient, the motor, shaft and propeller continue to turn at full speed - and therein lies a problem. If, for any reason, the pitch on the propeller blades does not come off when the controls are worked, the ship will not slow.

FSG was apparently not thrilled with the decision to use constant speed motors. Nor was ABS, the classification society overseeing much of the construction. A better option would have been to install variable frequency drives with cyclo converters or tap converters to control the electrical output to the drive motors and thus be able to control the speed of the drive shaft. If the propeller blade pitch fails to come off when commanded, the shaft speed could be reduced or even stopped thus slowing the ship.

The problem boiled down to dollars and euros. Variable frequency drives would have come in somewhat more expensive and the maintenance requirements for cyclo or tap converters is relatively high. BC Ferries went for the cheaper, much simpler propulsion system.

The kicker here is that BC Ferries knew all about this. In December 2007 BCFS was handed a report prepared by the firm of consulting engineers The Glosten Associates Inc., who were contracted to conduct a due diligence review of the Super C construction. They highlighted an area of concern entitled Propulsion System Reliability and it now appears those concerns were well founded. From that report:

There was considerable discussion at the site regarding the use of constant-speed propulsion motors instead of variable-frequency drives. While the constant speed motors simplify the overall system and eliminate the high maintenance cyclo converters, it results in the propulsion machinery running at full RPM all the time. The primary drawback is at the dock; when the nearly-feathered propeller is rotating at full RPM, any failure in pitch control could have severe consequences. This system has been fully reviewed and completely accepted, so while we do not suggest any physical changes, BCF should fully understand the pitch control reliability and failure modes, and consider including this topic in their vessel training program.

So, save money on simpler propulsion. Spend a lot more rebuilding a destroyed terminal berth.

Added: At least one reader here is interpreting the above incorrectly. Seems to think I believe that the forward system is engaged when the ship is in Transit mode (Mode 1). That is not the case. When the ship reverts to Transit mode from Harbour mode, after switching to Normal, the forward drive motor is disengaged, the shaft is braked and the propeller is feathered to reduce drag. My point, (and the issue pointed out by the surveying engineers), was that the drive propeller, which is nearly-feathered as the ship approaches the berth is running at full RPM. If a pitch control failure occurs the ship is suddenly launched forward.